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Abstract 
Sovereign credit default swaps (SCDSs) have been at the core of the Euro Area (EA) debt crisis, particularly in its 
periphery. Both EU politicians and a wide range of EU academics have asked for tighter regulation of these over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives, following similar pressures to the ones that had resulted from the 2008 financial crisis for 
corporate reference entities. As such, the SCDSs regulatory framework experienced a number of changes from 2009 to 
2014, in the EU. This paper provides a seminal assessment on whether these new rules have succeeded in preventing 
SCDSs exuberance episodes in the EU. Using daily data for 5 years maturity Greek SCDSs, comprising the period 
between the latest regulatory reform, in September 2014, and mid-March 2015, we find clear evidence of explosive 
behavior in SCDSs spreads, and even in upfront quotes. The authors take advantage of the new Phillips et al. (2015a, 
2015b) test for multiple exuberance episodes, which had rarely been used in derivatives markets, and conduct an event 
study to conclude that Greek elections, in early 2015, and the associated turmoil has led to a surge in momentum 
trading, with significant potential returns for SCDSs buyers. The regulatory measures aiming at deleveraging these 
markets, standardizing contracts, and dissociating sovereign and banking risk, do not seem to have achieved their 
purposes, as the political and financial anxiety in Greece, starting in December 2014, has led to explosive behaviour 
episodes in the market for Greek SCDSs, of the type regulators had tried to avoid. 
Keywords: sovereign credit default swaps, explosive roots, financial regulation, euro debt crisis, momentum trading, 
market exuberance. 
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Introduction© 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are OTC credit insurance 
derivatives concerning a certain reference entity 
(corporate or sovereign). The protection buyer agrees 
to pay periodic amounts (coupons) during the 
agreement’s lifetime. The seller makes no payments, 
unless a credit event, related to the underlying 
reference entity, occurs. Credit events are defined by 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA). Currently, they include bankruptcy, failure to 
pay, obligation default or acceleration, repudiation, 
restructuring and government initiated bail ins for 
financial sector reference entities (ISDA, 2014). CDSs 
quotes usually refer to spreads, expressed in basis 
points (bps, where 1 bps is (1/100)%). An increase in 
the spread is perceived to represent worsening credit 
quality of the reference entity.  
For a long time, CDSs were mostly used to hedge 
buyers’ longpositions in bonds markets. 
Notwithstanding, since 2005, CDSs usage for trading, 
by investors, who did not hold bonds of the underlying 
entity (uncovered or “naked” CDSs), increased 
significantly (Bannier et al., 2014). Uncovered CDSs 
buyers expect spreads to increase, in which case they 
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would profit from selling1. Explosive spreads growth 
would be an opportunity for huge gains by naked 
CDSs traders. 
However, for highly financially distressed reference 
entities 2  CDSs may be quoted in points upfront, 
expressed as percentages. In that case, a CDS buyer 
pays the seller an initial amount equal to upfront × 
notional value. An uncovered CDS buyer expects the 
upfront to increase, so that his return rate, when 
selling, is the difference between the quotes. Although 
points upfront have a natural upper bound, making 
explosiveness less likely, opportunities for very 
significant trading gains also exist in this setting, if 
they grow in a meaningful way: e.g. an investor 
buying a 5 years maturity Greek SCDS with notional 
value of 10 million Euro (14.4484 million USD3), on 
the 14th of April 2011, and selling on the 28th of 
August, would have had a gain of approximately 20% 
of the CDS notional, that is, 2 million € (2.8986 
million USD).  
                                                     
1 If a dealer has bought a CDS contract at a spread of 110, with a fixed 
coupon of 100 bps, and the spread rises to 125, the dealer may sell with 
a profit of 15 bps PV01, where PV01 is the expected sum of all 
discounted cashflows paying 1 bp. This implies that when buying the 
CDS the dealer has made an upfront payment of 10 bps, due to the 
difference between the par spread and the fixed coupon. Coupon 
payments are netted out, and if a credit event occurs, the dealer has 
hedged his position.  
2 The periodic payments should reflect the reference entity’s risk level. 
This would occur if they varied with the par spread. For fixed coupons, 
as in the previous example, these should also be set reflecting that, in 
order to compensate sellers for the risk they are taking, and to diminish 
counterparty risk for the buyer (the likelihood that a seller will default, 
causing the buyer to lose all periodic payments made, and, if he had 
bought CDS for hedging, exposing him to risk of default by the 
reference entity). 
3 Using historical exchange rates for the days in this example. 
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Finally, if a credit event occurs before the buyer has 
closed his position, the CDS is triggered and he 
receives4 (100% − recovery rate) × notional value, 
where the recovery rate should reflect the ratio of 
market to nominal values of the defaulted bond. 
Traditionally, CDSs had been dominated by corporate 
reference entities. SCDSs were mostly relevant for 
emerging economies (e.g. Chiarella et al., 2015). 
However, since the onset of the financial crisis in 
2007, SCDSs markets in developed countries have 
increased significantly in liquidity and trading volume 
(Broto and Perez-Quiros, 2015). The outstanding 
amount of SCDSs increased from 6% of all CDSs, in 
2007, to 13% in 2010 (BIS, 2010). The EA crisis is 
also at the core of the SCDSs surge: by June 2012, the 
top 15 sovereign reference entities, by gross notional, 
included 6 EA countries, 4 of which under financial 
distress: Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. In fact, 
Italy and Spain occupied the top two positions 
(Bannier et al., 2014). 
SCDSs spreads for some EA countries rose sharply 
during the financial turmoil. Most noticeably, 5 years5 
maturity Greek SCDSs spreads increased widely 
between late 2009 and the Greek debt restructuring on 
March 2012 (Figure 1). Furthermore, during the 2008-
2012 period, there are two patterns in EA countries 
SCDSs spreads: they move jointly (except for Ireland) 
until the first Greek bail out, but quickly become much 
higher in periphery countries afterwards (Figure 2). De 
Grauwe and Ji (2013) observe similar behavior in EA 
10-year government bond rates. This similarity further 
suggests linkages between the SCDSs surge and the 
EA crisis. Accusations supporting the idea that SCDSs 
were propelling the crisis, possibly being used for 
speculation, rising the yields of the EA periphery, were 
made at the political and the academic level (e.g. Stulz, 
2010; Damette and Frouté, 2010). A vivid discussion 
around CDSs had also occurred in the US, due to 
systemic implications of counterparty risk, following 
the AIG near bankruptcy in 2008. 
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Fig. 1. 5 year SCDSs spreads for Greece until the credit event of 2012 
 
For45 the first time, in their 20 years of existence, 
CDSs were on the spotlight. Political and public 
pressure led to SCDSs regulatory changes in the 
EU, as it had happened, for both corporate and 
sovereign CDSs, following the financial crisis. In 
fact, the current EU SCDSs regulatory framework is 
shaped by the standardization measures taken after 
the financial crisis episodes in the last months of 
2008 (particularly the rules set in the Big Bang 
Protocol and in the Small Bang Protocol, in 2009), 
the EU ban on naked SCDSs, in 2012, and the 
extension of credit event definitions, in 2014.  
                                                     
4 Irrespective of whether CDSs were being quoted in spreads or upfront 
points. 
5 The most liquid in CDSs markets. 
With respect to the 2009 protocols, some of their 
main implications for the current EU regulatory 
design are the definition of fixed coupons (EU 
SCDSs are currently traded with coupons of either 
25 bps, 100 bps or 500 bps) and a full first period 
accrual; the establishment of auction settlement 
mechanisms, even for restructuring credit events 
(the most relevant for sovereign reference entities) and 
the creation of Determination Committees. Concerning 
naked SCDSs, EU Regulation 236/12, implemented on 
the 1st of November, forbids buying SCDSs with an 
EU member-state as a reference entity, if the buyer is 
not exposed to such country’s sovereign debt. The 
extension of credit events came into effect on the 22nd 
of September 2014. Government-initiated bail ins of 
financial institutions were added to the list of events 
already considered (ISDA, 2014). This is of particular 
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relevance to the EU, since the new banking 
restructuring and resolution norms, enforced from the 
1st of January 2016 onwards, contemplate the bail in as 
one of the tools to be used.  
In spite of these changes, no evaluation of the 
current regulation in the EU has been made in the 
literature (as acknowledged, inter alia, by 
Ismailescu and Phillips, 2015). 
















Fig. 2. 5 year SCDSs spreads for EA countries in the 2008-2012 period 
 
This paper improves on the literature, by providing 
a first rigorous assessment on whether the current 
regulatory framework of SCDSs in the EU is able to 
avoid excess reactions, even under extreme market 
anxiety. In order to do so, we take advantage of the 
new test for multiple market exuberance episodes 
developed by Phillips et al. (2015a, 2015b). To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first application of 
this test in the debt capital markets literature and in 
the structured finance literature. It is also one of the 
first empirical applications in the derivatives 
literature6. In this sense, this paper introduces a new 
method for researchers interested in excess reaction 
of CDSs spreads. In fact, Coudert and Gex (2010) 
have used a contagion based approach, by noting an 
increased correlation in automobile firms CDSs 
spreads, after the surge in those of GM and Ford. 
However, there is no threshold for them to identify a 
“surge” episode. Andritzky and Singh (2006) have 
calibrated a CDS pricing model to conclude that 
changes in the recovery rate may induce huge 
increases in CDSs spreads, although the meaning of 
“huge increase” is unclear. Thus, no proper 
statistical test had been used to conclude as to 
explosive reactions, prior to this paper. 
Adding to this, our data, referring to 5 years 
maturity Greek SCDSs, with daily observations 
from the end of September 2014 to mid-March 
                                                     
6 In fact, the other examples pertaining to derivatives are exclusively 
focused on some commodities: crude oil futures (Tsevetanov et al., 
2015), non-ferrous metals futures (Figuerola-Ferretti et al., 2015) and 
agricultural futures (e.g. Etienne et al., 2015). 
2015, offers unique advantages. Firstly, the latest 
SCDSs regulations to date had already been 
implemented. Secondly, this period comprised 
extreme market anxiety, with the Greek political 
crisis in December 2014, resulting in a general 
election in January 2015, leading to a government 
with a highly defiant speech towards both the EA 
rules and the terms of the second Greek bail out, and 
that threatened to default on external debt payments, 
and to leave the Euro. Financial uncertainty is 
noticeable, with interest rates on government ten 
year bonds rising to 10.6% by the 7th of January, 
from 5.3% in late September, and with the ATHEX 
index losing 30% in this period. It’s hard to 
envisage a more adverse setting for the EA 
regulatory framework to be tested. 
Finally, we also innovate by assessing not only the 
behavior of spreads but also of quotes in points 
upfront, and by doing so for different fixed coupons. 
This is most relevant since, in spite of the fact that 
Greek SCDSs have been quoted in points upfront in 
recent years, the extensive literature on SCDSs and 
the Greek debt crisis has only been focused on 
spreads. Moreover, the literature never refers to 
possible differences in behavior under different 
coupons, for the same maturity and reference entity. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the literature on the linkages between 
SCDSs and the EA crisis, and on possible regulatory 
measures. Section 2 details the hypotheses 
formulated and the methodology used. Section 3 
describes the data and provides foundations for the 
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choices made. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Final Section summarizes and 
concludes the paper. 
1. Literature review 
This section addresses the literature on the three 
major channels through which SCDSs might propel 
the crisis: the direct relationships between SCDSs 
and their underlying reference entities, the sovereign 
bonds; the relationship between CDSs, sovereign 
risk and banking risk, when sovereign bonds are a 
part of banks’ assets; the systemic risk posed by the 
opaqueness of OTC derivatives, such as CDSs.  
1.1. SCDSs and sovereign bond markets in the EA. 
SCDSs are highly leveraged financial instruments. 
Investors may take uncovered CDS positions, often 
without any initial outlay (Coudert and Gex, 2013). 
Compared with the bonds market, where an investor 
has at least to borrow in order to buy bonds, 
investment in SCDSs is cheaper, propelling 
momentum trading, if investors expect the credit 
quality of the reference country to deteriorate. If 
such expectation persists for some time, SCDSs 
spreads may rise explosively, since spreads do not 
have an upper bound, due to the theoretical 
impossibility of perfect arbitrage between SCDSs 
and the bonds markets (Duffie, 1999). Palladini and 
Portes (2011) provide empirical evidence showing 
that CDSs and bonds spreads are cointegrated, but 
the long run equilibrium parameters’ estimates are 
not compatible with perfect arbitrage, and short run 
deviations persist for long periods. Excess reaction 
or explosiveness of CDS spreads is in fact not only 
possible, but well documented (Andritzky and 
Singh, 2006; Coudert and Gex, 2010). Chiarella et 
al. (2015) have shown that, for financially distressed 
economies, trading momentum played a 
fundamental role in determining SCDSs spreads. 
Adding to the likelihood of excess reaction, 
evidence of Granger causality from SCDSs spread 
movements, to movements in sovereign bonds 
spreads (e.g. Damette and Frouté, 2010), that 
Delatte et al. (2012) translate into a leading role of 
the SCDSs market over the sovereign bonds market 
in the price discovery process, raised the possibility 
that high yields in fragile economies were being 
caused by speculative attacks on SCDSs markets. 
Damette and Frouté (2010) made this claim 
explicitly and called for regulatory intervention. 
In short, the literature identified the high leverage of 
SCDSs as the fundamental driver of the problems 
above, as spreads excess reactions were more likely, 
inducing higher bond yields. The impact of the 
speculation argument has led the literature to debate 
mainly one strategy to reduce leverage: banning 
naked SCDSs. Regulation suggestions by, inter alia, 
Posner and Weyl (2013), point to banning naked 
CDSs, in order to guarantee that buyers have an 
insurable interest. 
On the other hand, Beber and Pagano (2013) and 
Ismailescu and Phillips (2015) have argued that 
whenever naked CDSs were banned a loss of 
liquidity in bonds markets had occurred. The 
conclusion that increases in SCDS spreads Granger 
caused increases in bond spreads (Damette and 
Frouté, 2010) was challenged on the basis of the 
absence of similar evidence in other sample periods 
studied (IMF, 2013). Furthermore, the idea of 
banning naked SCDSs was criticized for regulating 
a financial instrument, instead of addressing the 
problems of fragile economies. Adding to this, 
Heinz and Sun (2014) have shown that the lower 
volatility in sovereign bond yields on the second 
half of 2012 was a result of a global decrease in risk 
aversion, with no need for naked SCDSs bans. 
1.2. Sovereign and banking risk, with bank’s 
exposure to government bonds. This strand of the 
literature has been developed as a result of two 
observable facts of the EA crisis: banks owned 
large portfolios of government bonds; there was a 
period in the financial crisis and in the EA debt 
crisis (from 2008 to 2012) when distressed banks 
were likely to be bailed out. The argument in this 
literature usually goes as follows: if SCDSs 
spreads for a periphery EA country were rising 
sharply, causing a rapid growth in sovereign bond 
yields, banks with significant exposure to that 
country’s debt would suffer losses in the value of 
their assets; as banks’ default risk was rising, the 
need for recapitalization became clearer, making a 
bail out likely. Irrespective of whether the public 
recapitalization was done issuing new government 
bonds, or with public borrowing from EU 
institutions, investors clearly understood the bail out 
represented a significant increase in sovereign risk7. 
Therefore, SCDSs spreads would further increase 
after a bank bail out, implying that government 
bond yields would rise even more, lowering the 
price of sovereign bonds, and imposing additional 
losses on banks. The likelihood of further banks’ 
recapitalizations would increase. This vicious circle 
is well documented. Alter and Schüller (2012) 
highlight the role, in the negative amplification 
cycle, of banks’ CDSs and SCDSs, in the EA. 
Bruneau et al. (2014) argue that banks’ CDSs were 
the drivers of SCDSs markets’ sentiments. 
                                                     
7 An example of this perception is the downgrading of Spanish 
sovereign bonds by Moody, in June 2012, following a loan of 100 
billion € (126.38 billion USD) by the European Stability Mechanism for 
bank recapitalization (Moody’s Investor Service, 2012). 
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One could argue that the linkage between SCDSs 
and banks’ CDSs had been broken as the EU moved 
from bail outs to contingent convertible bonds, and 
even bail ins with hair-cuts on bank bond holders 
and depositors. In fact, the bail in is set to be 
generalized in the EA, from January 2016 onwards 
(European Commission, 2014). Klimek et al. (2015) 
established that under no scenario public funded 
bank bail outs outperform bail ins with private 
sector involvement. In short, one might think 
banking regulation would have solved the problem, 
with no need for CDSs’ regulation.  
Notwithstanding, the 2013 Cyprus bank bail in 
episode8 suggests that bail ins may also increase 
sovereign default probabilities, as a result of capital 
flights, by depositors and bond holders (Parigi, 
2014). A negative cycle may still exist: increasing 
SCDSs spreads may cause losses to banks, 
augmenting the probability of another bail in.  
The EU is aware that the deposits insurance side is 
to be solved by banking regulation (European 
Commission, 2014). Minimum levels are defined, 
below which deposits would not be converted into 
capital or used to pay creditors. However, for bank 
bond holders, a solution should go through some 
type of extensions of CDSs protection. 
1.3. CDSs opaqueness: OTC products and 
systemic risk. Finally, with respect to the 
opaqueness of OTC products such as CDSs, the 
literature has suggested a channel through which 
they could increase systemic risk. Angelini (2012) 
argues that CDSs negatively affected the stability of 
the banking sector due to moral hazard, as riskier 
portfolio choices were made under the idea that 
assets were insured by CDSs. The problem becomes 
clear in economic downturns, where a number of 
CDSs are likely to be triggered, as credit events are 
more frequent (Rowe, 2011). The concentration of 
major CDSs sellers in a few banks, combined with 
the existence of naked CDSs, fosters counterparty 
risk to unknown levels, exposing the financial sector 
to serious systemic default risk (e.g. Gai et al., 
2011). Banks’ recapitalization needs would increase 
sharply. Even under the new EU banking regulation, 
increases in sovereign risk, with a possible negative 
loop, might well occur. 
On the regulation side, lack of information on OTC 
products could be overcome by means of central 
clearing. Loom and Zhong (2014) argue that this 
would increase market transparency and reduce 
counterparty risk. Standardization of SCDSs 
agreements could also increase transparency and 
liquidity, while mitigating counterparty risk. 
                                                     
8 For details of the Cyprus banking crisis see, e.g., Orphanides (2014). 
2. Research hypotheses and methodology 
2.1. Main research question and associated 
research hypotheses. As stated in the introduction, 
the research question we address in this paper refers 
to whether or not the SCDSs regulatory framework 
currently prevailing in the EU has managed to 
prevent excess reactions in SCDSs behavior. 
Following the previous two sections, we are now 
adding additional research hypotheses, derived from 
the fundamental one, as subquestions. We also 
intend to test these. In particular, we shall look at 4 
specific hypotheses: 
H1: Are quotes in upfront points immune to excess 
reaction episodes for financial distressed countries, 
as their upper bound, and the lower leveraging of 
SCDSs by non-negligible initial outlays for buyers, 
suggest? 
H2: Has the introduction of fixed coupons, with 
standardized reference values reflecting different 
likelihoods of a credit event, avoided excess 
reaction episodes for distressed economies, as 
SCDSs would be deleveraged, since buyers have 
higher periodic payments, and, even for spread 
quotes, are more likely to have initial outlays?  
H3: Has the inclusion of government initiated bail 
ins in ISDA’s credit event definitions, jointly with 
the abandonment of bank bail outs, prevented 
SCDSs excess reaction episodes in economies with a 
fragile banking system, under heavy financial 
distress and high market anxiety? 
H4: Has the ban on naked SCDS with EU member 
states as reference entities, enforced by EU 
Regulation 236/2012, prevented subsequent 
episodes of excess reaction, even under high market 
anxiety, as SCDSs would be less leveraged? 
2.2. Methodology. In order to address the research 
questions formulated, the Phillips et al. (2015a, 
2015b) double recursive, right-tailed alternative, 
unit root test shall be used. In practice, this is a test 
for explosive roots in financial time series, based on 








1 εφβμ .                       (1) 
Where {xt} is the time series of interest. Standard 
assumptions are made: E (εt) = 0, E (εt2) = σ2. The null 
hypothesis entails the unit root case H0: δ = 0, and the 
alternative refers to an explosive root H1: δ > 0 => p > 
1, (as usual, δ = p - 1). For a recursive test, one needs 
to define an initial window size, r0. Equation (1) is 
estimated recursively, with the first observation as the 
starting point, and subsets of sample data increased 
by one observation stepwise. For a subsample 
starting at the initial observation, and letting r2, with 
r0 < r2 ≤ 1, be the fractional size of the full sample 
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(normalized to the unit interval), the corresponding 
ADF test statistic is denoted by ADFr2 Letting r2 vary 
in the interval [r0; 1], the sequence of observed test 
statistics, {ADFr2}, is obtained. 
A test for periodically collapsing bubbles might be 
based on this sequence, as Phillipsnet al. (2011) had 




ADFrSADF ∈= .                           (2) 
Evidence of explosive behaviour existed if the 
observed SADF statistic was bigger than the right 
critical value for a given significance level. Homm 
and Breitung (2012) show that the SADF test 
performs well with periodically collapsing 
bubbles. Its shortcoming is that the starting point 
is fixed: the first sample observation. It is argued 
(e.g. Bettendorf and Chen, 2013), that when two 
bubbles exist in the sample, if the second is 
overpowered by the first, detection of the second 
with the SADF test may fail. Phillips et al. 
(2015a) have addressed this by nesting the SADF 
test in a loop which increments the starting point, 
r1, with r1   [0; r2 − r0]. The Generalized SADF 
statistic (GSADF) is therefore the largest ADF 
statistic in the double recursion over all feasible 
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Source: Phillips et al. (2015a). 
Fig. 3. The sample sequences and window widths of the SADF test and the GSADF test 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the different sample sequences in 
the SADF and the GSADF tests. The GSADF test 
covers significantly more subsamples of data, with 
increased window flexibility, thus being more 
efficient in detecting multiple bubble episodes, 
when they occur in a given time series. 
Phillips et al. (2015a) show that the limiting 































































.                                                      (4) 
Where, rw = r2 − r1 and B is a standard Wiener 
process. 
The asymptotic distributions of the SADF and the 
GSADF test statistics depend on a nuisance 
parameter: the smallest possible window size r0. In 
practice, r0 can be thought of as a function of the 
total number of obervations T. If T is small, r0 needs 
to be large enough to guarantee that there are 
enough observations for initial estimation, in the 
recursions. Phillips et al. (2015a) have conducted 
simulation studies, and suggested the heuristic rule 




81010 +=                                                     (5) 
Critical values are provided for some sample sizes 
in Philips et al. (2015a), but the recommended 
practice is to simulate the sequence of these for 
conventional 1%, 5% or 10% significance levels, in 
each empirical study. 
Further, Philips et al. (2015a) developed a 
backwards strategy to obtain the GSADF statistic, 
with the purpose of dating the beginning and the 
end of multiple bubbles within a series. The 
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backwards strategy allows for such date 
estimators to be consistent (see Phillips et al., 
2015b, for detailed proofs).  
The backwards SADF test (BSADF) performs a sup 
ADF test on a backwards expanding sample 
sequence, where the end of the sample is fixed at r2, 
and recursively regressing up to the starting point, 
that varies from 0 to r2 - r0 (the sample fraction 
corresponding to the origination of the window). 
Hence, the test statistic is given by (6): 
2
1 2 0 1[0; ]
( ) { }
2
r
r 0 r  r r rBSADF r sup ADF .∈ −=                    (6) 
Hence, the GSADF test starts from the 
implementation of the backwards sup ADF test 
repeatedly for each value r2   r0; 1], leading the 
test statistic to be based on the sup value of the 
backwards sup ADF sequence. 
]1;[ 02
)}({ rr0r rBSADF 2 ∈ , as in (7): 
0[ ;1]
 { ( )}
2 2r r r 0
GSADF sup BSADF r .∈=                     (7) 
3. Data description 
We have obtained 125 daily observations for 
spreads and quotes in points upfront of 5 years 
maturity Greek SCDSs. We have collected series 
both for ISDA 2014 and ISDA 2003 credit event 
definitions. This is only possible since Greece has 
maintained both types of SCDSs after the 2014 
regulatory change. All series were collected for 
SCDSs with coupons of 100 and 500. The sample 
comprises the period between the 22nd of September 
2014 and the 16th of March  2015. That is, we have 
daily observations for spreads and for points 
upfront, each of which under the new and the old 
credit definitions, for both coupons. The resulting 8 
series were obtained from Markit®9. 
The start date of our sample matches the beginning 
of SCDSs trades with the ISDA 2014 definitions. 
The end date allows us to capture significant 
episodes of the Greek political crisis. In particular, 
this sample period comprises the announcement, on 
the 8thof December 2014, of the need to elect a new 
President, the three failed attempts of such an 
election in the Greek parliament (the last being on 
the 27th of December), the announcement of a 
general election on the 29th of December, the 
extremely favorable polls for the defiant left wing 
                                                     
9 The authors have downloaded historical data on SCDSs for the EA 
from Markit®. Thus, daily data for spreads and/or quotes in points 
upfront are available, along with a range of credit risk metrics, since 
2008. For each country, data are obtained for all traded coupons and for 
all traded credit event definitions. For each coupon and ISDA credit 
event definition, data for 7 different SCDSs maturities (ranging from 6 
months to 30 years), are available. For CDSs, Markit®’s database is of 
the highest quality, given the firm’s leading role in financial information 
services for fixed income securities. 
party Syriza, anxiety episodes in the bonds market 
in early January, the outcome of the elections on the 
25th of January, the announcement of parliament 
support of a Syriza government on the 5th of 
February 2015, and the first month of the newly 
elected government. 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
In this section, we shall present and discuss the 
results obtained from applying the Phillips et al. 
(2015a, 2015b) testing and date-stamping 
methodology to each of the eight series in our 
sample. Our objective is to provide an answer to the 
research question this paper addresses. In particular, 
we shall investigate whether or not the current EU 
regulatory framework, described briefly in 
Introduction, has succeeded in the objective of 
avoiding explosive behavior in SCDSs quotes. The 
implications of such excess reactions have been 
discussed in detail in section 1.  
In order to properly address the question, we have 
chosen a sample period complying with two 
requirements: the most recent developments in the 
EU regulatory framework were already 
implemented, and the sovereign reference entity was 
under extreme political pressure, and market 
anxiety. As detailed in section 2, we have defined a 
subgroup of 4 research hypotheses that will allow a 
richer answer for our main research question. 
Given our sample size T = 125, equation (5) leads 
us to choose r0 = 0.17, implying a minimum 
window length of 21 observations for recursive 
estimation. Relevant quantiles of the GSADF 
statistic were obtained by Monte Carlo simulation, 
with M = 1000 iterations. Table 1 presents the 
observed GSADF test statistics and corresponding 
p-values, for spread and upfront quotes of Greek 
SCDSs with a coupon of 100. All results are 
presented both for SCDSs traded under the 2003 and 
the 2014 ISDA credit event definitions. 
Table 1. GSADF explosive root test for coupon 100 
 
ISDA 2003 ISDA 2014 
Upfront Spread Upfront Spread 
GSADF 
statistic 1.224045 2.314981 2.433846 4.032572 
p-value 0.2710 0.0220 0.0170 0.0000 
Results in Table 1 are sufficient to conclude with 
respect to research hypothesis H3, concerning the 
impact of the inclusion of government initiated bail ins 
in ISDA’s credit event definitions, on the behavior of 
SCDSs. The expectation underlying H3 was that the 
extended definitions would help avoiding excess 
reactions in SCDSs quotes. However, this expectation 
is not confirmed by the data. In fact, the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of Phillips et al. (2015a, 2015b) 
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test, both under ISDA 2014 and ISDA 2003, for SCDS 
spreads, provides evidence that excess reactions may 
occur irrespective of credit event definitions. With 
respect to ISDA 2003, table 1 allows to reject the null 
at 5% significance (p-value is 2.2%), and, for ISDA 
2014, rejection occurs even at 1% significance (p-
value is approximated to 0.0%). Nonetheless, although 
spreads are relevant for traders as a tool to estimate 
default probabilities for the reference entity, Greek 
SCDSs are quoted in points upfront, rendering spreads 
meaning less to determine trading profits of buyers 
that close their SCDSs position before a credit event. 
Hence, the relevance of the new definitions should 
also be assessed on the basis of upfront points. 
Results in table 1 show that the null of a unit root is not 
rejected (p-value of 27.1%) for 5 years maturity Greek 
SCDSs upfront quotes under ISDA 2003. However, 
for SCDSs under ISDA 2014, the null is rejected, at 
5%, in favor of an explosive root in points upfront 
quotes (p-value of 1.7%). Hence, exuberance is found 
in upfront quotes for SCDSs traded under the new 
credit event definitions, but not under the previous 
ones. In conclusion, research hypothesis H3 is 
dismissed10.  
Table 2. GSADF explosive root test for coupon 500 
 
ISDA 2003 ISDA 2014 
Upfront Spread Upfront Spread 
GSADF 
statistic 1.648358 2.314981 3.075606 4.032572 
p-value 0.0860 0.0150 0.0020 0.0000 
Research hypothesis H1 refers to the possibility that 
upfront quotes would be immune to explosive 
behavior, due to the upper bound at 100, and to the 
deleveraging effects of the initial outlay. Evidence 
from Tables 1 and 2 for upfront quotes shows that the 
null of a unit root is rejected in favor of explosiveness, 
in three of the four series studied. For coupon 500, the 
null is rejected for both credit definitions. For coupon 
100, it is rejected for the new definitions. Hence, 5 
years maturity Greek SCDSs upfront quotes exhibit 
explosive behavior during the sample period, 
dismissing the conjecture H1. 
Research hypothesis H2 is based on the conjecture that 
a higher fixed coupon would discourage momentum 
trading, avoiding excess reactions. An answer may be 
achieved with Table 2 alone, as it refers to SCDSs 
with a coupon of 500 (Table 1 refers to a coupon of 
100). The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
against an explosive alternative, for both spreads and 
points upfront, and for both ISDA definitions. Thus, 
the reference coupon for distressed sovereign 
                                                     
10 Table 2 leads to the same conclusion, with evidence showing 
explosive roots in upfront quotes under both credit event definitions, 
considering a significance level of 10% for ISDA 2003. 
entities is unable to avoid episodes of explosive 
behavior. H2 is false. 
Finally, research hypothesis H4 was related to the 
conjecture that the EU ban on buying naked SCDSs 
with member-states as reference entities, would 
deleverage these instruments, preventing excess 
reaction episodes. The ban was implemented on the 1st 
of November 2012, so it is valid during our sample 
period. The evidence we have discussed so far, allows 
us to conclude that the ban did not prevent 
explosiveness in SCDSs behavior. In fact, tables 1 and 
2 show that an explosive root exists in 7 of our 8 
series11.  
An answer to the fundamental research question in this 
paper has been achieved. The overwhelming evidence 
in favor of the existence of explosive roots in all but 1 
series, leads us to conclude that the current EU 
regulatory framework is unable to fully prevent 
exuberance episodes in SCDSs markets. 
In order to properly document our conclusion, we shall 
take advantage of the output from the Phillips et al. 
(2015a, 2015b) consistent date-stamping methodology 
to estimate the starting dates of SCDSs exuberance 
episodes in the sample period. The 4 graphics in 
figures 4 and 5 illustrate the behavior of the BSADF 
test statistic that we shall use for this purpose. 
Figure 4 refers to coupon 100 SCDSs, and figure 5 
to coupon 500. In each figure, the first graphic 
refers to behavior under ISDA 2003 definitions, and 
the bottom one to behavior under the ISDA 2014 
conventions. For all plots, the blue line represents 
the BSADF observed test statistic sequence for 
spreads, the red line represents the BSADF observed 
test statistic sequence for quotes in points upfront, 
and the green line represents the sequence of 
simulated critical values, at a 5% significance level. 
A common feature of all four graphics is the huge 
increase in the BSADF test statistic in early 
December 2014. Retrieving the numerical 
sequences, the increase started on the 8th of 
December, the day of the announcement of the 
presidential election. The Phillips et al. (2015b) 
date-stamping method shows that exuberance was 
estimated to begin on the 9th of December. 3 other 
exuberance episodes exist that are common to all 
spreads series. The estimated starting dates are the 
6th of January, as anxiety grew in the bonds market, 
the 27th of January, following the election results, 
and the 6th of February, the day after the Syriza 
government received parliament support. 
                                                     
11 Interestingly, the only case in the 2 tables where the null of the 
GSADF test is not rejected occurs for SCDSs with upfront quotes, 
under ISDA 2003, and with a coupon of 100. 
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Fig. 5. BSADF test: coupon 500 
 
In contrast, only one detected exuberance episode is 
common to all upfront series, with estimated starting 
date on the 9th of December. The conclusion is that, in 
spite of its lack of immunity to explosiveness, there are 
significantly fewer explosive episodes for quotes in 
upfront points than for spreads. In fact, the parliament 
support to the new government is never suggested as 
explosive behavior for upfront quotes. The election 
period is marginally found in some cases. The 
financial anxiety of early January is estimated to be an 
exuberance episode for SCDSs with coupon 500, 
under ISDA 2003, with estimated starting date on the 
6th of January. 
In conclusion, not only have we shown that explosive 
SCDSs behavior is possible, under the current EU 
regulatory framework, but we have also succeeded to 
date stamp them for Greece, in our sample period. This 
second step provides evidence that the market 
exuberance found is actually meaningful when 
assessed looking at the relevant dates of the Greek 
political crisis.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we have questioned the possibility of the 
occurrence of excess reaction episodes in SCDSs 
markets, under the current EU regulatory framework. 
Results from section 5 imply that SCDSs exuberance 
is not avoided, for a distressed country subject to a 
period of particular political uncertainty and financial 
anxiety. The path we have followed also allows us to 
conclude that explosive behavior is found even for 
the highest fixed coupon, for points upfront quotes, 
for the augmented credit events list, and in spite of 
the EU ban on naked SCDSs. We have made no 
claims on whether explosiveness is due to 
insufficient measures or mistaken options, nor have 
we suggested other regulatory measures. Those 
topics are outside the scope of this paper.  
Our results improve on the literature since this is the 
first paper to provide a rigorous assessment of the 
current EU regulatory framework, in spite of the large 
literature that has recently emerged on SCDSs and the 
EA crisis. Adding to this, to the best of our knowledge, 
the SCDSs literature had never studied upfront 
quotes’ behavior in detail, had never attempted to 
discriminate behavior according to the fixed 
coupon, and had never tried to assess the 
implications of different credit event definitions. 
Furthermore, with respect to banning naked SCDSs, 
the scarce literature is focused on liquidity 
implications alone.  
A natural extension of this paper, with respect to topics 
discussed in section 1, will be to study explosiveness 
in Greek sovereign bond spreads. If these are found, it 
seems natural to us to investigate whether there is co-
explosiveness between bond spreads and SCDSs 
spreads, following the suggestions in Engsted and 
Nielsen (2012) and Nielsen (2010). 
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